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1. Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the prospects for successful reform in the South 
East Europe (SEE) electricity markets with the emerging evidence on electricity reform 
from around the world. 
 
It is important to start by saying that the analysis of electricity reform is complicated. 
This is because reform can take many different forms, involves a number of interrelated 
steps and is an ongoing process. While many countries have engaged in electricity 
reform, few have made the sort of progress that the leading countries or jurisdictions have 
made (e.g. the UK, Norway and Texas) and even among the leaders, electricity reform 
remains ongoing. In these circumstances evaluation of reforms is difficult because what 
is being analysed is so often incomplete, even in the terms set by national governments 
for their own reforms. The interrelatedness of the reform steps also renders attempts at 
evaluating the impact of any given step (e.g. privatisation or the introduction of incentive 
regulation etc.) problematic. These observations immediately give rise to the suggestion 
that it is not clear that a proper evaluation of the impact of electricity reform using 
econometric analysis of a sample of jurisdictions can be expected to produce sensible 
results or even that detailed country case studies can allow a clear set of lessons to be 
identified.  
 
For advocates and critics of reform this complexity poses different problems. For 
advocates, it may difficult to produce evidence that electricity reform is clearly working. 
For critics it may be difficult to find clear evidence against reform. Advocates will 
always find it easy to say, most countries have not properly implemented the full package 
of reform measures and it is too early to draw conclusions. Critics will always be able to 
point to cases where reform has significantly failed – California being the classic case. 
 
                                                 
1 The author acknowledges the financial support of the ESRC Centre for Competition Policy (CCP) at UEA 
and of the ESRC Electricity Policy Research Group. He also wishes to thank Russell Pittman and 
participants at the CCP conference in Sinaia, Romania, July 2007,  for helpful discussions and suggestions. 
All remaining errors are his own. 
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It is useful to be up front about what has driven electricity reform. Reform has primarily 
been driven by the failure of the vertically integrated electricity supply industry, often 
state owned, to deliver (see Helm, 2004). By the early 1980s the electricity industry in 
developed countries could be characterised as having excess capacity, having made 
expensive technology choices and being productively inefficient. At the same time in 
developing countries, there was a chronic shortage of capacity and the need for massive 
investment in generation and the extension of networks (see Bergara et al., 1997). In 
these countries electricity supply was unreliable and electricity companies were 
chronically short of funds. Electricity reform was primarily about improving efficiency in 
developed countries and improving access and reliability in developing countries. 
Modern electricity reform initially began in Chile (1982), UK (1989) and Norway (1990) 
and has been led by Anglo-American and Latin American countries since then. 
 
Electricity reform should however be seen in its wider macroeconomic context. 
Electricity is a key sector in the modern economy and moves to improve the operation of 
the market more generally since 1980, form the backdrop to electricity reform. In all of 
the leading countries, electricity reform has been part of wider moves towards 
privatisation, smaller government and the extension of the role of the market. This is 
especially true in transition economies where electricity sector reform is clearly merely a 
part of wider reforms. 
 
From this wider perspective electricity reform requires careful evaluation, not just in 
terms of its effect on electricity consumers and producers but also in terms of the 
promotion of efficient markets and good government more generally. 
 
The SEE electricity markets constitute an important electricity reform experiment for the 
whole world. This is because these countries have been given a clear reform model to 
follow (from the European Union), have access to large amounts of technical assistance 
and reform is happening in the context of associated reforms in other sectors and 
government more generally. Thus the SEE is and will be a test of both the transferability 
of the EU reform model within the EU (from the leading reformers) and also its 
transferability to a set of developing countries more generally. It is an experiment that is 
being watched closely by the World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) and the European Union (EU). On the down side one might go so 
far as to suggest that if the reform model cannot be transferred successfully to this set of 
countries, it bodes ill for the further extension of the reform model to other countries in 
Asia or Africa.  On the up side the capacity for mutual learning (from the rest of the EU 
and from each other) and the scope for mid-course correction will be high and hence the 
chances of ultimate success would seem to be good. 
 
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. First, I will discuss the main elements of the 
EU electricity reform model. Second, I will go on to discuss emerging good practice in 
the regulation of national electricity markets in the EU. This is important because it 
reflects the key role placed on independent regulation of the electricity sector in the EU 
reform model. Third, I will evaluate the evidence on the success of the EU reform model 
in particular before, fourth, going on to discuss the evidence on the success of electricity 
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reforms more generally. Next we will consider the particular context of SEE electricity 
reform and what specific issues this raises, before concluding with a discussion of the 
importance of more general institutional context of SEE electricity reform. 
 
2. The European Electricity Reform Model 
 
Electricity reform in the EU has been primarily driven by two electricity directives in 
1996 and 2003 (see Jamasb and Pollitt, 2005).2 These directives outline a number of key 
elements that are summarised in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 
EU Electricity Directives 
Source: Vasconcelos (2004) 
 
 
  1996 DIRECTIVE 
 
2003 DIRECTIVE 
 
 
Generation 
 
Monopoly      → 
Authorisation 
 
Tendering 
 
Transmission 
 
Distribution 
 
Monopoly      → 
Regulated TPA 
Negotiated TPA 
Single Buyer 
 
Regulated TPA 
Supply Monopoly      → Free Free 
 
 
Customers 
 
 
No Choice     → 
Choice for Eligible  
(=1/3) 
All Non- 
Household (2004) 
All (2007) 
Unbundling of 
transmission and 
distribution 
None              → Accounts Legal 
 
Cross-Border 
Trade 
 
Monopoly      → Negotiated Regulated 
 
 
In essence the directives compel member states to move away from monopoly vertically 
integrated electricity supply industries towards deregulated electricity markets 
characterised by competitive wholesale generation, free entry of new plants, unbundled 
transmission and distribution wires, regulated non-discriminatory tariffs, competitive 
final supply markets and regulated trade across international inter-connectors.  
 
The 2003 directive (03/54) sets a number of key objectives to be achieved by 1 July 2007 
in each member state. These include the creation of an independent sector regulator, the 
legal unbundling of transmission and distribution businesses from competitive generation 
                                                 
2 In September 2007,  the EU Commission announced a ‘third package’ of electricity and gas market 
reform proposals. These could form the basis of a further directive aimed at creating a ‘truly competitive 
energy market’. See http://ec.europa.eu/energy/electricity/package_2007/index_en.htm 
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and supply, free entry into generation markets and regular monitoring of the progress of 
supply competition and 100% market opening to competition for all customers (including 
households). Special arrangements and other directives allow for measures to promote 
renewable generation (in addition to the market incentive provided by the EU 
Greenhouse Gas Emission Trading Scheme – EU ETS).  
 
The EU is very keen on the creation of a single European electricity market but 
recognises that in the meantime regional markets may emerge where wholesale power is 
traded and dispatched across a region involving more than one country. Such markets 
exist among Nordic countries (Nord Pool, which began in 1996) and are emerging in the 
France-Belgium-Netherlands regional market which began operating in November 20063. 
 
At the same time as pursuing a reform agenda via energy directives (similar pressure has 
come from reform directives in Natural Gas) the EU Commission has been making use of 
competition law to investigate market abuse allegations against electricity and gas 
utilities as part of the EU Energy Sector Inquiry (European Commission, 2007). This 
investigation highlights the need for structural reforms, such as those embodied in the 
Electricity Directives to be accompanied by vigorous competition law enforcement where 
abuses of market power become evident in a deregulated system. Such investigations 
may force further structural reforms beyond those envisaged by the current directives and 
reflect the experience of individual countries. Both the UK and Chile have similarly used 
competition law enforcement mechanisms to progress electricity reform beyond the level 
required by the enabling legislation (see Newbery, 2005, and Pollitt, 2004a). 
 
This brings us to some of the central theoretical propositions on which EU electricity 
reform is based. Basically electricity reform in the EU is an application of the theory of 
competitive markets in the context of an industry that has a number of vertically related 
stages of production, some of which are natural monopolies. This implies that the vertical 
stages must be clearly separated and moves towards reintegration must be policed (see 
Newbery, 1999). The natural monopoly elements are essential to production and hence 
need to be regulated according to theories of regulation (see Joskow, 2005). Such theories 
suggest that independent incentive based regulation is the best way forward. For the 
competitive stages of production, what is required are an increase in the number of firms 
(perhaps to five or more actual or potential competitors4) and reduced entry barriers 
(especially via the removal of legal restrictions on entrants and the monitoring of 
discrimination in entry conditions set by other stages of production). Increased market 
size (e.g. via the creation of regional markets) and the creation of an independent system 
operator facilitate competition by immediately increasing the number of competitors, 
reducing entry barriers and eliminating the scope for discrimination in dispatch of plant. 
                                                 
3 See www.belpex.be 
4 The US Department of Justice Horizontal Merger Guidelines use 1800 is the key value of the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index, above which markets are thought to be highly concentrated and where significant 
mergers raise ‘significant competitive concerns’ (see 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/horiz_book/hmg1.html). 
 An HHI value of 1667 is obtained if there are six equally sized firms in the market, 2000 if there are five 
firms, thus going below five firms raises ‘signficant competitive concerns’. The HHI is calculated as the 
sum of the squares of individual firm market shares, multiplied by 10,000. 
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The theoretical underpinnings of electricity reform are thus relatively straightforward and 
very much part of the EU’s wider Single Market agenda which rests on the same desire to 
have efficient regulation (and limitation) of natural monopolies and increased 
competition across and within borders. 
 
It is worth pointing out that EU electricity reform model does not include a number of 
elements that have been present in some of the leading reform countries. First, there is no 
requirement for privatisation of any of the currently state-owned assets. There is de facto 
a requirement to increase private involvement because competition in generation and 
supply must mean that privately owned entities can enter the market (particularly from 
other countries). Clearly in Latin America, the UK, New Zealand and parts of Australia 
there have been significant privatisations of electricity assets, though public ownership 
continues to be significant in Norway and New Zealand. It is also the case that in the EU-
15 around 50% of electricity assets are yet to be privatised (though many companies are 
now part privatised)5. Second, ownership unbundling of transmission system operation or 
transmission assets is not required by EU directives. This is in spite of the observation 
that all of the leading reform countries have independent transmission system operation 
(with or without ownership of the transmission assets). However the EU Energy Sector 
Inquiry seems likely to force change in this area at the EU level.  Many leading reform 
scholars have advocated both ownership unbundling for transmission and privatisation of 
electricity assets (e.g. Joskow (2006), Newbery (1999), Littlechild (2000)) as key 
elements of reform packages.  
 
3. Best Practice in European Electricity Reform 
 
While the general requirements of the EU reform model are clear, there is wide variation 
in the progress with the implementation of the model. While only a few countries have 
failed to comply with the model as required by the directive (e.g. Greece), rather more 
countries have complied reluctantly and belatedly with key elements of the model. The 
most spectacular delay in compliance was the introduction of an independent electricity 
regulator in Germany only in July 2005 (years after many developing countries and after 
all other EU countries). Compliance with the directive however does not imply a through-
going electricity reform. In many countries incumbent firms remain dominant in both 
generation and supply markets and further structural reform seems necessary if the 
theoretical conditions on which successful reform is based are to be achieved (see Jamasb 
and Pollitt, 2005). 
 
The key body charged with overseeing electricity reform in EU countries is the 
designated national regulatory agency for electricity. There is a strong correlation 
between the strength of this regulatory agency and the progress with electricity reform in 
a given country (see Green et al., 2006). As this agency is a central focus of how 
countries can make progress with reform we concentrate our discussion of best practice 
on the reform of this agency. 
 
                                                 
5 See www.privatizationbarometer.net 
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Green et al. (2006) identify three aspects of best practice in regulatory reform. First, the 
form of regulation, which relates to the powers and responsibilities of the regulatory 
agency. Second, the process of regulation, which relates to way that this agency carries 
out its activities. And finally, the outcome of regulation, which relates to the 
measurement of success for a regulatory agency. In each case suggest metrics for best 
practice. 
 
Larsen et al. (2005) focus on the form of regulation by examining the competencies and 
strengths of the regulatory agency. These include whether regulatory rules are set ex ante 
or ex post (ex ante being better for investment and efficiency of decision making), the 
extent of ministerial involvement (less being better due to the need to minimise arbitrary 
political intervention) and the strength of information acquisition powers (stronger being 
better for the monitoring of market power and the setting of regulated tariffs). Strong and 
effective regulators have control over tariff setting, network access terms, issuing of 
licences, setting of delivery terms and in settling disputes and enforcing punishments, as 
opposed to having any of these functions left to government ministers. An important 
element of independence is the tenure and terms of appointment of heads of regulatory 
agencies or commissioners (longer terms, less subject to arbitrary dismissal being better). 
Other elements worthy of consideration are the way the agency is financed (with freedom 
from general government expenditure pressure being better) and the way that employees 
are appointed and remunerated (with freedom from civil service pay scales being better 
where these are very low, and being acceptable where the quality of the civil service is 
high). The Larsen et al. analysis shows that there is a wide variation in the detail of the 
powers of EU regulators but that the most effective have more independence and control 
over the necessary elements of independent regulation.  
 
Strength of regulatory powers is of course tempered by the initial structure of the industry 
in terms of the amount of horizontal and vertical separation that exists. A strong regulator 
will find it much more difficult to deal with a vertically integrated monopoly than with a 
carefully unbundled and competitive industry due to the control over information that 
such an incumbent exercises and its political influence. Table 2 shows some form and 
situation indicators for regulatory agencies in SEE. If we take wholesale competition, 
legal unbundling of networks, a fully independent regulator, price or revenue cap with a 
3-5 year incentive period as the best form and situation that exists, only Slovenia meets 
all of these criteria. We also see that by the end of 2006 only Bulgaria had privatised 
more than 50% of its state owned electricity enterprises, with several countries showing 
no significant privatisation. 
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Table 2 
Some form and situation indicators for SEE electricity markets (end 2006) 
 
 % state 
electricity 
assets 
privatised6
 
Industry 
structure 
Type of 
unbundling 
Independence 
of regulator 
Transmission 
tariff setting 
Distribution 
tariff setting 
Incentive 
period 
(years) 
Albania 
 
 
0% Monopoly None Partially Price/revenue 
cap 
NA 3 
Bosnia-
Herzegovina 
 
c.15% Monopoly Limited 
Legal/Accounting 
Partially Cost+ NA  
Bulgaria 
 
 
>50% Wholesale 
comp 
Legal/Accounting Fully Cost+ Cost+/Revenue 
cap 
5 
Croatia 
 
 
0% Monopoly Legal Partially    
UNMIK 
 
 
0% Monopoly None  NA NA  
FYROM 
 
 
c.32% Wholesale 
comp 
Ownership/Legal Partially Revenue cap Price cap To be 
implemented 
Montenegro 
 
 
0% Monopoly Accounting Partially Price cap Price cap 1 
Romania 
 
 
17% Wholesale 
comp 
Legal/Accounting Fully Revenue cap Price cap 5 
Serbia 
 
 
0% Monopoly Legal Partially    
Turkey 
 
 
0% Wholesale 
comp 
Legal Fully Revenue cap Revenue cap 5 
Greece 
 
 
49% Monopoly Accounting Fully Cost+ NA  
Slovenia 
 
      
 
19% Wholesale 
comp 
Legal Fully Price cap Price cap 3 
 
                                                 
6 Source: www.privatizationbarometer.net, country chapters and estimates (assuming distribution share in 
asset value 35%). 
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Strength of the regulatory agency must translate into an effective process of regulation. 
This involves the competence with which the regulator carries out the tasks that it has 
been assigned. A key element of good process is transparency and hence predictability 
and accountability for decision-making. Transparency in regulation involves an effective 
process of consultation that allows views of competent industry and third party 
stakeholders to be expressed, publication of information on the web and an openness to 
learning from outside. In addition, regulators need to be procedurally efficient. This 
involves the publication of a detailed work plan and general consultation documents, the 
following of a regular pattern of reviews (particularly of regulated prices), the use of best 
practice methodologies (such as sophisticated benchmarking techniques for measuring 
efficiency of networks) and attention to proper incentivisation of non-price elements such 
quality of supply and investment. Good process also involves a willingness to be 
subjected to external ex post evaluation of decision-making. Evidence of regulatory 
failure to make well thought out or timely decisions would be evidence that a regulatory 
agency needed to improve its process of regulation. 
 
Measures of process might include: whether all documents are on the website; whether 
important documents are in English (for international evaluation); if there is a work plan 
on the website; whether targets of work plan have been delivered; if there is use of 
external advice; if there is ex post assessment of decision making and whether the 
regulator is an active member clubs of regulators (e.g. European Regulators' Group for 
electricity and gas (ERGEG) in the EU)7. Answering Yes to all of these would indicate a 
strong process of regulation. 
 
Clearly regulatory agencies need to be measured against outcomes. This is potentially 
rather difficult as clearly outcomes may not be fully under the control of the regulator and 
may rely on structural change that the regulator does not have the powers to deliver. 
 
For developing and transition countries the adequacy of the amount of investment, the 
level of capacity shortages and outages, the size of system losses (technical and non-
technical) and the percentage non-payment are important indicators which reform seeks 
to improve. For all countries, including developed ones, price trends, switching rates in 
retail competition, cost of regulation per unit of energy delivered are important indicators 
of how the regulator is doing. In addition the performance of the sector with respect to 
specific regulatory decisions is also an important measure of success. 
 
These measures can only be looked at country by country over time. As an example if we 
take the UK regulatory agency, Ofgem (see Green et al., 2006). There have been large 
price reductions in regulated transmission and distribution charges (30% and 50% 
respectively between 1993 and 2005) and a trend reduction in overall prices towards EU 
average. There has also been significant customer switching in all market segments, but 
particularly among households where 1.5% of households switch per month. The cost of 
regulation remains low in relation to the total electricity bill at 0.17m Euros per TWh and 
is subject to a revenue cap of RPI-3% for each year in the period 2005-2010. Detailed 
cost benefit analyses of specific regulatory decisions have been undertaken with some 
                                                 
7 See www.ergeg.org 
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doubt being cast on the cost effectiveness of full retail competition due to the high IT 
costs (Green and McDaniel, 1998) and the introduction of new wholesale market trading 
arrangements (Evans and Green, 2003), both of which were overseen by Ofgem (or its 
predecessor Offer). 
 
4. Evidence on the EU Reform Model 
 
In this section we address the issue of what the evidence is on the EU reform model in 
terms of delivery. It is important to stress that the EU reform model is primarily aimed at 
improving the productive efficiency of the sector by lowering costs and prices. For 
several SEE countries this may not be the primary aim, thus evaluation of reform impact 
will therefore take a different form for EU-15 countries than for the transition and 
developing countries within the SEE. 
 
We examine five studies that look at the cross country evidence on the impact of 
electricity reform at the sector level. Two of them use OECD (and hence mainly EU) 
countries, while the other three are explicitly on the EU. All involve panel data analysis 
of some kind. 
 
We begin with two academic studies (Steiner, 2001 and Hattori and Tsutsui, 2004). Both 
of these studies analyse similar datasets. Steiner (2001) conducts a panel data analysis on 
four variables: electricity price per unit, ratio of industrial to residential electricity price, 
generation capacity utilisation ratio and generation reserve margin. The first two 
measures get at the competitive aspects of reform and whether reform lowers prices or 
improves the efficiency of relative prices. The second two measures examine the cost 
efficiency of reform directly by looking at whether reform improves efficiency in the use 
of capital, given that OECD countries began their reforms with often significantly more 
capacity than was necessary. 
 
Steiner (2001) uses panel data for 19 OECD countries covering 1986-1996. This study is 
an early test of the reform model as the first electricity directive was only to be enforced 
by 1999. She tests a number of elements of the reform model separately: namely 
unbundling of transmission, the introduction of a wholesale power pool, third party 
access to transmission and also privatisation (which we have said is not part of the EU 
model). On unbundling she finds that the separation of generation and transmission is not 
associated with lower prices but is associated with a lower industrial to residential price 
ratio and higher capacity utilisation rates and lower reserve margins. However this study 
assumes that ‘unbundling’ occurs when there is accounting separation of businesses 
within a vertically integrated company as well as stricter models of unbundling (legal and 
ownership). ‘Accounting unbundling’ is the weakest possible form of unbundling. On the 
introduction of a wholesale power pool, there is a significant reduction in prices and the 
ratio of industrial to residential prices (the impact on cost efficiency is not examined), On 
the introduction of third party access the sign on prices and the price ratio is negative as 
expected but not significant, while it is not significant for the cost efficiency measures. 
Privatisation seems to raise prices and the price ratio but has no significant effect on the 
cost efficiency measures. 
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Hattori and Tsutsui (2004) examine a similar OECD data on the impact of unbundling of 
transmission from generation, third party access, the existence of a wholesale market and 
the impact of privatisation. They use analysis similar to Steiner but over a longer period 
1987-1999. They find that the unbundling variable seems to raise prices. However they 
use legal (or ownership) unbundling as their measure of unbundling. Hence, unlike 
Steiner, ‘accounting unbundling’ does not constitute unbundling. The introduction of a 
wholesale power pool also seems to raise prices, while the introduction of third party 
access or retail competition does seem to reduce prices. Meanwhile privatisation is 
associated with lower prices, such that a reform involving privatisation, wholesale power 
pool, third party access and legal unbundling has no overall impact on price. As several 
of the reforming companies in this sample reform quite late in the sample period it is not 
clear whether some of the differences in the two papers is coming from these late 
reforming countries. 
 
The conclusion from these two careful papers is that it is difficult to find clear 
econometric evidence one way or the other on the reform model in its early phases. 
 
Later evidence, of a less robust but more focussed kind, is provided by Ernst and Young 
(2006) and Thomas (2006). Both of these examine the price impacts of reform. 
 
Ernst and Young (2006) conducted a report for the UK government’s Department of 
Trade and Industry (DTI) that asks a number of questions.  These include: does 
liberalisation lower prices, does liberalisation lower costs and price-cost margins, do 
liberalised markets increase price volatility, does liberalisation inhibit investment, do 
liberalised markets provide reliable and secure supply, and do liberalised markets interact 
effectively with other public policies (such as on climate change)? They use a sample of 
EU-15 countries and examine this question for electricity and gas with a large number of 
simple regressions. Their answer to all of these questions in the case of electricity is yes. 
 
Thomas (2006) examines a number of reports including Kema (2005) and European 
Commission (2005) which look at (or comment on) electricity prices. These studies 
suggest that reforms in the EU have been associated with lower prices. However he is 
critical of the evidence they present. He suggests that most focus on the period 1995-
2000 over which the reforms were not fully implemented, that commodity prices are not 
adequately accounted for (this is important given that they may have been falling over the 
sample period) and that recent price rises seem to have wiped out previous falls. 
Furthermore he suggests that the EU reform model’s real test is whether it can deliver 
timely investment to meet the emerging investment gap following the elimination of short 
run inefficiency and initially high reserve margins. 
 
Finally, in a more careful academic price study, Florio, Florio and Doronzo (2007) 
examine the impact of reform on household electricity prices in 15 EU countries over the 
period 1978 to 2005. They distinguish three reform variables: public ownership, entry 
regulation and vertical integration on a 0 to 6 scale (0=no public ownership, 0=no entry 
regulation and 0=no vertical integration). They find that for simple log linear functional 
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form panel data equations none of the reform variables are individually significant. The 
signs on the entry regulation and vertical integration are (generally) in line theoretical 
predictions that less of each of these variables implies lower prices, while the sign on 
public ownership is negative, indicating that more public ownership leads to lower prices. 
This study is interesting in that it tries to distinguish reform elements. However clearly 
some countries have failed to implement throughgoing reforms e.g. Germany failing to 
vertically disintegrate its industry, while others have successfully introduced competition 
and vertical disintegration without full privatisation (e.g. Sweden). Thus it would seem 
that measures of progress on individual reform variables may not reflect the overall 
success of a reform package. 
 
A key conclusion from all of these studies is that econometric evidence on the impact of 
the EU model is limited and will take more time to emerge. It has also been largely 
focussed on price and short run cost efficiency. There has been little attempt to test 
overall reform progress (e.g. with a single reform variable) or to distinguish all the 
elements of reform carefully (e.g. incentive regulation). Clearly the ability of the model 
to deliver efficient investment, especially in generation, has not been established by 
econometrics. However it is encouraging that Norway, Finland, Sweden and UK seem to 
show that markets can meet generation investment requirements and that incentive 
regulation can inventivise adequate network investment. 
 
However as Littlechild (2006) points out experience with some elements of the European 
reform model such as full retail competition is very limited, even globally. Even after 8 
years that UK has just reached 50% switching by residential customers to non-incumbent 
suppliers and most EU countries are a long way behind this. 
 
At this point we note the result of larger macroeconomic study by Copenhagen 
Economics (2005) which looked at the impact of EU-15 reforms - over the period 1990-
2001 - in electricity, telecommunications, air transport, rail transport, urban transport, gas 
and postal services. This study used a general equilibrium model to estimate the overall 
macroeconomic impact of these reforms. This showed that the combination of lower 
prices and lower costs in all these sectors was of the order of 2% of GDP, of which two 
thirds arose from electricity and telecoms reforms (p.22). This sort of permenant rise in 
GDP/social welfare is well worth having. However the range of benefits was wide in 
terms of social welfare ranged from 0.4% in Greece to an impressive 6.5% in Finland. 
The report states that ‘Those member states who opened markets more and who started 
early have gained the most.’ (p.22-23). 
 
In closing I should point out that there is evidence of successful reform at the country 
level within the EU, e.g. for the UK (Newbery and Pollitt, 1997, and Domah and Pollitt, 
2001) and for Nordic countries (von der Fehr and Bergman, 2005), but as countries may 
have implemented additional measures to those required by the EU (e.g. privatisation in 
the UK), it is not conclusive that these provide evidence for the EU reform model per se. 
 
5. Evidence on electricity reform in developing and transition economies 
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In developing and transition economies the focus of electricity reform is not on short run 
efficiency improvement and price reduction. Reform may include significant price 
increases, with many prices having to be increased substantially to ensure cost recovery. 
Privatisation may also be significant as part of an overall move to improve the operation 
of the market within the country. In addition countries may be introducing transparent 
and effective processes of independent regulation for the first time. 
 
There have been a large number of studies looking at electricity reform in developing 
countries generally (see Jamasb et al., 2004). The evidence of these studies covers a 
wider range of variables than those tested in the EU focussed studies and addresses 
additional issues such as the role of wider institutional arrangements (outside the 
electricity sector), energy resource endowments (whether self-sufficiency encourages 
reform), the impact of reform on investment and energy losses and the role of 
privatisation and independent regulation. 
 
Jamasb et al. (2004) summarise the econometric evidence contained in Wolak (1997), 
Zellner and Henisz (2000), Bacon and Besant-Jones (2001), Drillisch and Reichmann 
(1998), Holborn (2001), Siniscalo et al. (2001), Ruffin (2003), Bergara et al. (1997) and 
Zhang et al. (2002). They conclude, based on these studies, that: 
 
1. Political and judicial institutions and energy resource endowments matter for progress 
with reform.8
 
2. Privatisation improves efficiency if accompanied by independent regulation. 
Competition improves efficiency in generation. Independent regulation alone is not 
significant for efficiency. 
 
3. Privatisation has no significant effect on prices, competition has a mixed effect on 
prices, regulation has no significant effect on prices. 
 
4. Private investment is stimulated by the strength of property rights protection and the 
presence of independent regulation.9
 
5. Vertical integration reduces the amount and value of privatisation. 
 
In addition to the econometric evidence there have been a number of detailed analyses of 
aspects of reforms or the whole reform programme in some of the early reformers. Thus 
there are well-documented case studies of electricity reform in Chile, Argentina, Peru, 
Philippines, Brazil, Columbia and Ukraine (see Jamasb et al., 2004). None of these 
countries has pursued the EU model as far as the EU (no developing country has full 
                                                 
8 This has been supplemented further by evidence in Weizmann and Bunn (2004). 
9 This is also supported by Cubbin and Stern (2005), see section 6. Guasch et al. (2003) further find that 
concession contracts – including in the electricity sector - in Latin America were less likely to be 
renegotiated if a regulator was in place at the time of contracting. Given the fact that increased likelihood of 
contract renogiation raises the riskiness of investment, this constitutes evidence that appropriate ex ante 
regulation improves the investment environment. 
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retail competition) but there have been significant positive experience and illustrations of 
how problems may be overcome. Some of the gains have been very high: Toba (2003) 
estimated that the liberalisation of Philippine electricity generation produced a one-off 
gain equivalent to around 10% of GDP, while Mota (2003) estimated that the 
privatisation (and incentive regulation) of Brazilian electricity distribution produced a 
one-off gain of more than 2% of GDP. 
 
The evidence suggests that privatisation, wholesale market competition and independent 
regulation are key elements of a reform in a developing country. However the leading 
countries sometimes exhibit features not seen in the EU (e.g. cost based bidding into the 
power pool in Chile). Where all three of these are present there is evidence of improved 
efficiency though prices may have to rise from uneconomic levels. The presence of 
initially uneconomic prices presents a key political problem for developing countries. 
While developed countries may find prices falling due to reform or have the capacity to 
absorb or adjust to rising prices for low income groups via the tax and benefit system this 
may be more difficult for a developing country. 
 
While there seems to be plenty of potential for improvement from a judicious 
combination of reforms in the transition countries in SEE, the problems in delivering 
benefits to society are not be underestimated. This may be particularly true of the smaller 
SEE countries. For small countries, where the scope for competition may be limited and 
managerial expertise is scarce, the benefits of a full reform package may be small in 
relation to the costs. Besant-Jones (2006), in a developing country context, defines small 
power systems as being less than 1000 MW. However he notes that Guatemala has a 
competitive wholesale power market with a capacity of 1875 MW. Without adequate 
interconnection wholesale competition may therefore be an issue in some SEE countries 
(e.g. Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, UNMIK, FYROM and Montenegro). See Appendix 1 
for a table indicating the size of the SEE countries. Another issue related to size is 
highlighted by Domah et al. (2002), who suggest that small developing countries are 
likely to have a human resource problem in regulation where the need to achieve 
minimum efficient scale for a regulatory agency may imply a large number of highly 
skilled staff relative to size of the electricity sector. 
 
6. Key challenges facing successful reform in SEE 
 
In this section we ask a number of specific questions which electricity reform in the SEE 
will need to address. These questions arise from the need to implement the EU reform 
model but are not necessarily addressed by the evidence on electricity reform available to 
date. These include: how can prices be raised to economic levels; how to attract (often 
foreign) investment; how to create a regional market (rather than a set of national 
markets); when to deregulate the residential market; and when (and how) to privatise 
electricity assets? 
 
First, how can prices be raised to economic levels? An essential part of a successful 
reform in any country is that price distortions are minimised. This is important for a 
number of reasons. These include the need to achieve cost reflective tariffs that ensure 
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the financial viability of efficient firms in the industry. Investment and quality of supply 
can only be ensured if they are capable being sustainably financed from customers. 
Additionally customers should face the correct price signals on which to base their 
consumption and investment decisions. Cheap subsidised energy reduces the incentive to 
economise on fuel and creates an energy intensive economy with high environmental 
impact. That is not to say that there should be no subsidies to any customers. Several 
countries do have explicit policies of uniform residential tariffs across the country (e.g. 
Turkey). This may not represent a major distortion as long as the uniform pricing is 
revenue neutral from the point of view of the whole industry and there is efficient 
revenue recycling scheme such that revenue received by suppliers in different regions is 
cost reflective. 
 
The transition and developing economies within the SEE have already seen substantial 
price rises. However Figure 1 indicates that sub-economic pricing and tariff recovery 
rates exist in several countries. It is difficult to explain the substantial variation in 
published residential prices between adjacent countries. If Slovenia has economic prices, 
clearly Macedonia (FYROM), Montenegro, Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina are a long 
way short of this. This is evidence of a substantial under pricing of residential electricity. 
Bill collection rates, even at low prices, are only 80% in Albania and Macedonia. 
 
Figure 1 
Economic Prices in SEE? 
(Source: EBRD, 2006) 
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Note: Bill collection rate for Montenegro not available 
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The scale of the challenge posed by any attempt to raise prices is indicated in Figure 2. 
This figure shows the percentage of household income being spent on electricity by the 
bottom decile in various SEE countries in 2005. It also shows what this percentage would 
be if prices were raised to economic levels (even after taking account of the effect on 
demand of higher prices). For FYROM,  Croatia and Serbia and Montenegro the 
imposition of economic cost recovery would lead to substantial rises in required 
expenditure to over 10% of income. The true cost of such price rises may be even higher 
as the current expenditure figures reflect actual household expenditure: disguising the 
impact of theft, bill arrears and the cost of alternative fuels (e.g. wood) as electricity 
consumption is reduced. If a household spends 10% of more of its expenditure on 
electricity this constitutes the usual definition of fuel poverty (see Fankhauser and Tepic, 
2005). Although the term makes little economic sense (one could just as well define 
‘food poverty’ or ‘transport poverty’) and simply reflects general ‘poverty’, it is a 
political concern. In advanced countries with well developed welfare systems, a rise in 
prices of one good consumed by the poor to economic levels might simply be handled by 
an increase in welfare payments within the tax and benefit system. In developing 
countries with unresponsive or poorly developed welfare systems this may be not be an 
option, hence the original reason for direct price intervention for poor consumers. Only 
rising incomes and an improved tax and benefit system may eliminate the need for 
distortionary pricing. 
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Figure 2 
Fuel Poverty in SEE 
(Source: Fankhauser and Tepic, 2005) 
 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
Ro
ma
nia
Alb
an
ia
Slo
ve
nia
Bo
sn
ia-
He
rze
go
vin
a
Bu
lga
ria
Cr
oa
tia
Se
rbi
a a
nd
 M
on
ten
eg
ro
FY
RO
M
Electricity
expenditure as %
total expenditure
2005 
Electricity
expenditure as %
total expenditure at
full cost recovery 
 
 
 
Schemes for the specific protection of low income users can be efficiently designed, such 
that richer customers pay a levy and the marginal price of energy facing low income 
consumers is cost reflective. It is also desirable that even if some consumers must receive 
‘free’ electricity, that someone pays for it. Following liberalisation in Argentina nearly 
650,000 urban slum dwellers had their connections regularised with in some cases local 
authorities paying electricity suppliers for electricity that free at the point of delivery 
(Pollitt, 2004b). The local authorities imposed a local electricity tax on those who did pay 
to finance the payments. 
 
Second, how to attract new (often foreign) investment? There is a need for new 
investment in many of the electricity systems of SEE. In particular there is a requirement 
for new generation capacity, capable of meeting environmental targets set by the EU, and 
the upgrading of transmission and distribution networks. Such investment needs to be 
substantially foreign in order to embody the latest technology and operational 
efficiencies. The attraction of such investment requires security of property rights both 
via the judicial system and regulatory process but also in terms of physical security (from 
conflict or theft). Governments can work to reduce regulatory uncertainty and commit to 
cost reflect tariffs for electricity companies. Power purchase agreements can help offer a 
degree of certainty to generation investors but do potentially lock in high prices (this was 
the case in Northern Ireland where a single buyer model with long term power purchase 
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agreements was followed to ensure the success of privatisation (see Pollitt, 1997)). 
However proper incentive regulation and competitive wholesale markets can help ensure 
that private sector investment does flow (following Bergara et al., 1997). Indeed Cubbin 
and Stern (2005) find that better regulation increases electricity investment by 15-25% 
for their sample of developing countries. 
 
Third, how to create a regional market (rather than a set of national markets)? Regional 
markets require adequate cross-border transmission capacity and appropriate supra-
national regulation.  Many of the SEE countries are very small and interdependent. 
Clearly a single electricity market for the region would seem to make a lot of sense. For it 
function effectively there would need to be adequate cross-border transmission capacity 
to reduce the amount of time when transmission constraints effectively mean that the 
markets become national again and hence allow the benefits of cross-border trading. 
Agreeing to the required transmission investment is difficult.  An international grid 
operator has recently in 2007 been created in Central America to operate a new long 
distance transmission link in that region, having first been proposed in 1996, indicating 
the problems of getting agreement on how to create and regulate such international 
entities.10 Part of the delay in the South American case was getting approval for an 
investment where the benefits and costs were unequally shared between the countries, 
making those whose net benefits were lower slower to agree to an investment the benefits 
of which largely accrued to others.  
 
A proper regional market (in the sense of Nord Pool or France-Belgium-Netherlands) 
needs to be regulated by a supra-national regulatory or quasi-regulatory body. This would 
be necessary to monitor market power within the regional system, especially where 
national competition authorities are not competent or empowered to investigate abuses in 
one part of the system which effected another part. Much of the ‘regulation’ can be done 
through the market rules (as in Nord Pool) but a supranational regulator would seem to be 
important. The EU Commission might be able to fulfil this rule but not all the countries 
are in the EU and hence a regional regulator (in the style of FERC’s relationship to the 
state level PUCs) would seem to be necessary. A supra-national regulator might also 
provide information sharing on distribution and final tariff calculations and provide the 
sort of comparative information, collected on a similar basis, that can be used in national 
distribution price control reviews. In this way it might find parallels in the high degree of 
cooperation between Nordic Regulators and the emerging role of ERGEG at the EU 
level. 
 
Fourth, when should the residential market be deregulated? Although this policy is now 
in force across the EU it remains controversial for developing countries.11 In the SEE the 
                                                 
10 See www.eprsiepac.com. The countries involved are Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua, 
Costa Rica and Panama.
11 Even in progressive markets, like the UK, questions can be asked about the efficacy of residential 
competition. There is evidence (see for example, Salies and Waddams Price, 2004)  that a substantial group 
of customers may never switch from incumbents (who then charge them higher prices) and that these 
customers may be the poorer ones; and that many of those that do switch may not switch to better deals. 
This appears to raise questions about the rationality of consumer choice in general. However it is not clear 
 18
degree of market opening to competition is limited. Table 3 indicates the degree of 
market opening in the SEE. No country has opened all of its residential market to 
competition and several have more limited market opening. Besant-Jones (2006) 
expresses the World Bank experience with electricity market competition in developing 
countries. He suggests that cost-based spot markets have often been effective (especially 
in Latin America) and are simpler and less risky than price based spot markets, that 
competition can be allowed to evolve slowly (no developing country has full retail 
competition), bilateral trading is possible for developing countries and a temporary single 
buyer arrangement can be considered. Clearly until competition is viable and 
distributional issues are less acute (perhaps due to effective levy arrangements, welfare 
payments or simply rising incomes), retail competition would seem to be a politically 
dangerous experiment for a developing country used to subsidised energy. 
 
Table 3 
Degree of Market Opening in SEE, 2006 
(Source: ERRA webite) 
 
 Size of open 
market by sales 
  
Albania 
 
2 large customers
Bosnia-
Herzegovina 
None
Bulgaria 
 
25%
Croatia 
 
>50%
UNMIK 
 
4 large customers
FYROM 
 
~30%
Montenegro 
 
None
Romania 
 
81%
Serbia 
 
16%
Turkey 
 
30%
Greece 
 
65%
Slovenia 
 
64%
                                                                                                                                                 
that the answer to these issues is price regulation, it may be better information and regulatory monitoring, 
combined with a clear commitment to caveat emptor, given that competitive deals are available.  
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Finally, when (and how) should electricity assets be privatised? Much of the SEE 
electricity sector remains state owned. The evidence we reviewed in the previous section 
showed that privatisation combined with incentive regulation and competition yielded 
substantial benefits for developing and transition countries. Krishnaswamy and Stuggins 
(2003) provide a roadmap to privatisation. This involves sorting out labour agreements, 
fuel supply agreements and rights of way before privatisation. Such deals need to be 
politically expedient but time limited. Indeed the UK government did do deals with 
unions to guarantee jobs and with domestic coal suppliers ahead of privatisations, 
however these were time limited to ensure that there was minimal disruption from these 
sources in the early years of privatisation but that eventually the benefits of competition 
from the ending of these deals could be realised. It is also important to raise prices to 
economic levels before privatisation. This is important not just to ensure investor interest 
but also that easy gains from improving revenues are captured by the state not by private 
investors. The actual privatisation process needs to be via transparent international 
tendering with a willingness to allow foreign ownership, to involve the offering of 
majority states to attract strategic investors, though golden shares and restrictions on 
resale may be important for maintaining some political control over the evolution of 
market structure (which might otherwise become concentrated in the face of weak 
competition policy enforcement). Foreign ownership is beneficial because it provides 
capital and because it provides new technology and management techniques.12 The 
temptation to create national champions needs to be resisted, not least because it 
promotes corruption and is ineffective in promoting national investment (Ades and Di 
Tella, 1997)13. Clearly countries need to avoid the sort of dishonest and collusive equity 
for debt swaps and asset stripping which characterised some of the Russian privatisations 
that have had such significant and long-running political consequences. 
 
7. Institutions, politics and progress with reform in the SEE 
 
The EBRD conduct an annual assessment of the progress of reform in the electricity 
sector and more generally in the SEE. The results for 2006 are summarised in Table 4. 
This shows that on a scale of 1-4 (4 being the best), there is still some way to go in the 
implementation of reforms in the electricity sector. However Table 4 also shows the 
progress of reform in competition policy more generally – this is much less advanced. 
This immediately indicates that the wider institutional framework within which electricity 
reform is progressing may be more challenging. Competition policy is an essential part of 
any electricity reform because reform places a greater burden on competition authorities 
to monitor the electricity market and deal with any market abuses. The final column of 
Table 4 goes further by noting the legal origin of SEE countries in the famous LLSV 
(1999) paper. This paper suggested that countries with socialist and indeed French legal 
                                                 
12 Blackman and Wu (1999) provide such evidence on the positive impact of FDI in the Chinese electric 
power sector. Neuhaus (2006) provides evidence more generally on the positive correlation between FDI 
and economic growth in central and eastern Europe. 
13 Ades and Di Tella (1997) use a sample of 32 developed and developing countries. They find that 
corruption is higher in countries with higher levels of industrial subsidy. The extra corruption in turn offsets 
a substantial proportion of the direct investment effect of subsidy, leaving subsidies significantly less 
effective than otherwise. 
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origin had a strong disadvantage in economic development, relative to English legal 
origin countries. 
 
Table 4 
Progress with Reform and Legal Origin 2006 
 
 Electric power Competition Policy Legal origin
EBRD Transition score 2006 Max=4+, Min=1 LLSV (1999)
Albania 2.7 2 Socialist
Bosnia-Herzegovina 3 1.7 Socialist
Bulgaria 3.7 2.7 Socialist
Croatia 3 2.3 Socialist
UNMIK Socialist
FYROM 3 2 Socialist
Montenegro 2.3 1 Socialist
Romania 3.3 2.7 Socialist
Serbia 2.3 1.7 Socialist
Turkey French
Greece French
Slovenia 3 2.7 Socialist
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
e.g. Electric Power, 3=Law passed providing for full-scale restructuring of industry, including 
vertical unbundling through account separation and set-up of regulator. Some tariff reform and 
improvements in revenue collection. Some private sector involvement.  
Competition Policy, 2= Competition policy legislation and institutions set up; some reduction of 
entry restrictions or enforcement action on dominant firms.  
Source of EBRD Transition score: www.ebrd.com 
 
 
The link between electricity reform and institutions more generally remains poorly 
explored. Electricity reform requires fundamental change of the institutions in the 
electricity sector (e.g. the creation of an independent regulator and an Independent 
System Operator), however these institutional changes occur in the context of ‘deeper’ 
institutions such as competition policy, the judiciary, political fora etc… The extent to 
which electricity reform can make up for deficiencies in these ‘deeper’ institutions is 
limited. Argentina provides a classic case of an excellent electricity reform (which was 
successful for almost 10 years) derailed by wider government’s institutional failures 
(Pollitt, 2004b). 
 
The literature on the wider institutional context emphases: the connection between ‘deep’ 
determinants and financial crises (Bordo, 2006), the association of legal origin and 
economic growth (LLSV, 1999) and how poor resource endowments, can with difficulty, 
be overcome by good general institutions (Easterly and Levine, 2002). 
 
These observations suggest that the SEE countries need to focus on strengthening 
property rights more generally, pay attention to the nature of the legal systems being put 
in place and overcome resource endowment (energy security) concerns with good 
institutional arrangements to deal with the issues raised by resource endowments. It is 
important to also realise that mere institutional form is not a substitute for effective 
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institutional operation (there is likely to be a Lucas critique in institutional form) and that 
the details of laws are important beyond general legal origin (see Siems, 2006, who takes 
the LLSV work further to ask what differences exist in the detailed law codes between 
countries?). 
 
Institutional change requires political support. Anderson and Sitter (2007) point out that 
while the institutional changes required by EU energy directives aimed at creating a 
single European energy market by homogenising national institutions. The reality is that 
‘homogeneous integration may be the exception rather than rule’ (p.3) and that political 
differences explain actual patterns of integration. This reflects the conclusions of an 
earlier World Bank (1995) study that suggested that successful liberalisation of economic 
activity required a sufficient combination of political desirability (political benefits must 
outweigh costs), political feasibility (leadership must be strong enough to overcome 
opposition) and political credibility (promises to compensate losers and protect winners 
must be believed). Attempts to build institutions which promote competition and 
independent regulation also require such political pre-conditions. 
 
General institution building is undoubtedly very difficult but can be done. Chile provides 
a clear example of a successful electricity reform in a developing country with very 
effective general institutions. Indeed Chile ranks 27th in the Global Competitiveness 
Index (above Spain, Greece and Italy) in 2006. It is to be hoped that SEE countries will 
provide less politically painful (than Chile), but equally economically successful 
examples in the future. 
 
8. Conclusions 
 
In closing I draw a number of conclusions. 
 
First, electricity reform is complex and the evidence is difficult to evaluate. Reform 
remains a work in progress where careful thought is needed on the exact institutional 
changes to put in place in the electricity sector. In particular there must be a willingness 
to learn and change the arrangements as information comes through and problems are 
identified. 
 
Second, it is not clear that the EU electricity reform model in its entirety is the best for 
SEE. The EU model is only at the trial stage in the EU-25. Evidence from other 
developing countries suggests that alternative arrangements do exist, are workable and do 
bring substantial benefits. 
 
Third, electricity reform is part of wider institutional reforms. It will not be successful 
unless there is sufficient institutional reform in the rest of the economy to support 
developments in the electricity sector. 
 
Fourth, small countries either need to be integrated into bigger electricity markets or to 
have special arrangements. The project to create a single regional market is therefore 
more important to small countries than to large ones. 
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Fifth, market integration raises institutional fit issues. The track record on successful 
supra-national electricity markets is limited. Nord Pool is a great example but clearly 
relies on substantial similarities in the institutional arrangements within Nordic countries 
and a history of economic cooperation. It is a substantial challenge to make such 
arrangements work in the SEE. 
 
Finally, climate change and security of supply issues pose enormous challenges to the EU 
electricity reform model. It is unclear, even at the EU level, whether these challenges will 
eventually derail the competitiveness agenda embodied in the EU Electricity directives. 
Clearly the EU ETS and increased market integration and co-ordination can be consistent 
with meeting climate change and security of supply objectives. However in all European 
countries these issues will test politicians commitment to market based reforms.  
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Appendix 1 
 
Table A1 – Basic Data on SEE countries 
(Sources: EBRD, CIA Factbook, ERRA, World Bank) 
 
 
Population GDP per cap TWh consumption
million PPP USD 2005
Albania 3.2 5201 6
Bosnia-Herzegovina 3.8 7822 10
Bulgaria 7.7 8820 44
Croatia 4.4 13185 16
UNMIK 2 1600 4
FYROM 2 7268 8
Montenegro 0.7 3800 5
Romania 21.7 9165 59
Serbia 10.4 4400 27
Turkey 72.6 8400 150
Greece 11.1 22300 60
Slovenia 2 21500 14    
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